ouroboros/src/tools/irm, branch testing

ipcpd: Add flow overshoot protection to mb-ecn

2026-07-22T07:04:47+00:00

The ECN marks were the only source of congestion information, and going into congestion collapse (dropping a lot of ECN packets and causing loss of signal) was unrecoverable. The sender's slow-start ramp clock now tracks a measured RTT to avoid overshooting into congestion collapse on the previously fixed (14ms) doubling on long-delay (e.g. 100ms) links. The flow allocator now carries a periodic heartbeat/ack to keep RTT estimates up-to-date. The heartbeat also serves as a congestion collapse detector: consecutive heartbeat losses will go into loss recovery, halving the window and pausing Additive Increase until the path is clear. The DT component now has a max_rtt config parameter that serves as a hint for the layer RTT to optimize slow-start for low-latency networks. These two mechanisms follow TCP, however only during slow start up to the first ECN signal and to recover from a total collapse until the ECN signal returns. MB-ECN is still fully RTT-independent in the AI/PD region. A shorter RTT path will just reach its equal fair share faster than a longer RTT path. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

config: Rename enc.conf to sec.conf

2026-06-29T06:32:59+00:00

The per-name config file holds more than encryption settings (KEX, cipher, KDF, peer authentication), so renamed it from enc.conf to sec.conf and the code internals to match. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

lib: Update FRCP implementation

2026-05-20T06:17:07+00:00

The Flow and Retransmission Control Protocol (FRCP) runs end-to-end between two peers over a flow. It provides reliability, in-order delivery, flow control, and liveness. Note that congestion avoidance is orthogonal to FRCP and handled in the IPCP. A fixed 16-octet header, network byte order, is prefixed to every FRCP packet: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | flags | hcs | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | window | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | seqno | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ackno | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | payload (variable) ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ hcs is a CRC-16-CCITT-FALSE checksum over the PCI (and the stream extension when present), verified before any flag-driven dispatch. A single packet can simultaneously carry DATA + ACK + FC + RXM by OR-ing flag bits. An optional CRC trailer covers the body on DATA when qs.ber == 0, and on every SACK packet; an optional AEAD wrap (per-flow keys) sits outermost. Flag bits (MSB-first; bits 13..15 reserved, MUST be zero): +------+--------+--------+----------------------------------------+ | Bit | Mask | Name | Meaning | +------+--------+--------+----------------------------------------+ | 0 | 0x8000 | DATA | Carries caller payload | | 1 | 0x4000 | DRF | Start of a fresh data run | | 2 | 0x2000 | ACK | ackno field valid | | 3 | 0x1000 | NACK | Pre-DRF nudge (seqno informational) | | 4 | 0x0800 | FC | window field valid (rwe advertisement) | | 5 | 0x0400 | RDVS | Rendezvous probe (window-closed) | | 6 | 0x0200 | FFGM | First Fragment of a multi-fragment SDU | | 7 | 0x0100 | LFGM | Last Fragment of a multi-fragment SDU | | 8 | 0x0080 | RXM | Retransmission | | 9 | 0x0040 | SACK | Block list follows in payload | | 10 | 0x0020 | RTTP | RTT probe / echo (payload follows) | | 11 | 0x0010 | KA | Keepalive | | 12 | 0x0008 | FIN | End of stream marker | | 13-15| -- | -- | Reserved (MUST be zero) | +------+--------+--------+----------------------------------------+ (FFGM, LFGM) encodes the fragment role of a DATA packet (SCTP-style B/E): 11=SOLE, 10=FIRST, 00=MID, 01=LAST. Each fragment carries its own seqno; Retransmission recovers fragments individually, reassembly runs at consume time. In stream mode FFGM/LFGM are unused; per-byte position is carried by the stream extension below and end-of-stream is signalled by FIN on a 0-byte DATA packet. SACK payload (FRCT_ACK | FRCT_FC | FRCT_SACK): 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | n_blocks | padding (2 octets) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | start[0] | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | end[0] | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ... n_blocks pairs total ... Each block describes a *present* (received) range strictly above the cumulative ACK in the PCI ackno. D-SACK (RFC 2883) is signalled in-band as block[0] - no flag bit, no extra framing - and consumed by the RACK reo_wnd_mult scaler (RFC 8985 sec. 7.2). RTTP payload (FRCT_RTTP only; 24 octets): 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | probe_id | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | echo_id | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | + nonce (16 octets, echoed verbatim) + | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Stream PCI extension (in_order == STREAM only; 8 octets after the base PCI on every DATA packet): 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | start | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | end | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ start, end are monotonic 32-bit byte offsets; end - start equals the on-wire payload length. Stream mode is negotiated at flow allocation; the extension is present iff stream mode is in use, never on a per-packet basis. Service modes are an orthogonal (in_order, loss, ber) vector selected at flow_alloc; the cubes above map to the axes: +----------------+---------+------+-----+-----------------------+ | Cube | in_order| loss | ber | Engaged | +----------------+---------+------+-----+-----------------------+ | qos_raw | 0 | 1 | 1 | Raw passthrough | | qos_raw_safe | 0 | 1 | 0 | Raw + CRC trailer | | qos_rt | 1 | 1 | 1 | FRCP, no FRTX, no CRC | | qos_rt_safe | 1 | 1 | 0 | FRCP, no FRTX, CRC | | qos_msg | 1 | 0 | 0 | FRCP + FRTX | | qos_stream | 2 | 0 | 0 | FRCP + FRTX, stream | +----------------+---------+------+-----+-----------------------+ in_order=0 sends raw datagrams with no PCI (UDP-equivalent); in_order=1 engages FRCP with SDU framing; in_order=2 (stream) requires loss=0 and is rejected otherwise. loss=0 engages the FRTX retransmit machinery. ber=0 appends the CRC-32 trailer; QOS_DISABLE_CRC at build time forces ber=1 for development. Encryption is a separate per-flow attribute layered as an AEAD wrap outside the FRCP packet. Heritage: delta-t (Watson 1981) supplies timer-based connection management - no SYN/FIN handshake, the DRF marker, the t_mpl / t_a / t_r timers. RINA (Day 2008) supplies the unified flow_alloc(name, qos, ...) primitive and the orthogonal QoS-cube axes. Loss detection follows TCP/QUIC practice (RFCs 2018, 2883, 6582, 6298, 8985); RTT probing is nonce-authenticated like QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE. Adds oftp, a minimal file-transfer tool over an FRCP stream flow. The client reads from stdin or --in FILE and writes through a flow_alloc(qos_stream); the server (--listen) calls flow_accept and writes to stdout or --out FILE. Both sides compute a CRC-64/NVMe over the bytes they handle and print the result. The server rejects flows whose negotiated qs.in_order != STREAM. Two FRCP knobs are exposed via env vars on either side: OFTP_FRCT_RTO_MIN fccntl FRCTSRTOMIN (ns) OFTP_FRCT_STREAM_RING_SZ fccntl FRCTSRRINGSZ (octets) The ocbr_client gains an OCBR_QOS env var to pick the cube the client uses for flow_alloc; recognised values are raw, safe, rt, rt_safe, msg, stream. Unknown values fall back to raw with a warning on stderr. Without the env set behaviour is unchanged. Removes the deprecated lib/timerwheel.c Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

build: Update copyright to 2026

2026-02-18T06:54:56+00:00

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

lib: Add post-quantum cryptography support

2026-01-19T07:29:29+00:00

This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication (ML-DSA). Supported key exchange algorithms: ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448 Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024 Supported ciphers: AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305 CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr Supported HKDFs: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512, blake2b512, blake2s256 Supported Digests for DSA: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512, blake2b512, blake2s256 PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when available. KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles: one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles: kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy) kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key) The enc.conf file format supports: kex= # Key exchange algorithm cipher= # Symmetric cipher kdf= # Key derivation function digest= # Digest for DSA kem_mode= # Server (default) or client none # Disable encryption The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication infrastructure for integrity and replay protection. Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c). Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0 (required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

build: Refactor CMake modules

2026-01-07T09:00:06+00:00

This moves the CMake build logic out of the source tree and splits it up into a more modular form. The tests now have a CMakeLists.txt file in their respective source directory. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

build: Only add tests when BUILD_TESTING is ON

2025-11-07T07:35:48+00:00

By default, BUILD_TESTING = ON due to the inclusion of the CTest module. Signed-off-by: Thijs Paelman Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

lib: Move encryption control from QoS to name

2025-09-10T06:21:58+00:00

This removes the flow encryption option (cypher_s) from the qosspec. The configuration file is configured in the security options (default /etc/ouroboros/security/). For this poc, encryption can be disabled client or server side by putting an enc.cfg file. If that file is present in the client folder, the client will require encryption. If that file is present on the server side, the server will require encryption and reject non-encrypted flows. Encryption is now configured outside of any application control. Example: /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/enc.cfg exists: irmd(II): Encryption enabled for oping. irmd(DB): File /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/crt.pem does not exist. irmd(II): No security info for oping. irmd(DB): Generated ephemeral keys for 87474. irmd/oap(PP): OAP_HDR [caf203681d997941 @ 2025-09-02 17:08:05 (UTC) ] --> irmd/oap(PP): Certificate: irmd/oap(PP): Ephemeral Public Key: [91 bytes] irmd/oap(PP): Data: irmd/oap(PP): Signature: Example: /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/enc.cfg does not exist: irmd(II): Allocating flow for 87506 to oping. irmd(DB): File /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/enc.cfg does not exist. irmd(DB): File /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/crt.pem does not exist. irmd(II): No security info for oping. irmd/oap(PP): OAP_HDR [e84bb9d7c3d9c002 @ 2025-09-02 17:08:30 (UTC) ] --> irmd/oap(PP): Certificate: irmd/oap(PP): Ephemeral Public Key: irmd/oap(PP): Data: irmd/oap(PP): Signature: Example: /etc/ouroboros/security/server/oping/enc.cfg exists: irmd(II): Flow request arrived for oping. irmd(DB): IPCP 88112 accepting flow 7 for oping. irmd(II): Encryption enabled for oping. irmd(DB): File /etc/ouroboros/security/server/oping/crt.pem does not exist. irmd(II): No security info for oping. irmd/oap(PP): OAP_HDR [3c717b3f31dff8df @ 2025-09-02 17:13:06 (UTC) ] <-- irmd/oap(PP): Certificate: irmd/oap(PP): Ephemeral Public Key: irmd/oap(PP): Data: irmd/oap(PP): Signature: irmd(WW): Encryption required but no key provided. The server side will pass the ECRYPT to the client: $ oping -l Ouroboros ping server started. Failed to accept flow: -1008 $ oping -n oping -c 1 Failed to allocate flow: -1008. Encryption on flows can now be changed at runtime without needing to touch/reconfigure/restart the process. Note: The ECRYPT result is passed on via the flow allocator responses through the IPCP (discovered/fixed some endianness issues), but the reason for rejecting the flow can be considered N+1 information... We may move that information up into the OAP header at some point. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

ipcpd: Add ipcpd over UDP/IPv6

2025-09-10T06:19:52+00:00

This adds an IPCP that runs over UDP/IPv6. It's structured like the eth-dix and eth-llc in that it builds two separate binaries: ipcpd-udp4 and ipcpd-udp6. The IRM CLI is backwards compatible in that type 'udp' will resolve to type 'udp4'. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

irmd: Fix memleak in security path configuration

2025-08-23T06:51:21+00:00

Moved the conversion and check to a small function to avoid code duplication. Also moved the checks to a small function in the irm name create tool. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens