diff options
| author | Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> | 2026-06-21 14:18:38 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks> | 2026-06-29 08:33:00 +0200 |
| commit | 4b16f7b9ba95f7e24ff443e5b215c2823c1387f7 (patch) | |
| tree | d52f169067ab7b8faca90ef2b97b624803e61a68 /src/irmd/oap/cli.c | |
| parent | 55a8136859d82d9bdb8f85abb25290177ca7e561 (diff) | |
| download | ouroboros-4b16f7b9ba95f7e24ff443e5b215c2823c1387f7.tar.gz ouroboros-4b16f7b9ba95f7e24ff443e5b215c2823c1387f7.zip | |
oap: Rename kex_config loaders to sec_config
Leftover from the kex_config->enc_config->sec_config rename. Finished
by renames load_kex_config and the cli/srv variants to
load_sec_config, the kcfg variables to scfg, and fixes the "KEX
config"/"encryption config" comments.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/irmd/oap/cli.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/irmd/oap/cli.c | 106 |
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/cli.c b/src/irmd/oap/cli.c index 2db56792..689d67ca 100644 --- a/src/irmd/oap/cli.c +++ b/src/irmd/oap/cli.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ struct oap_cli_ctx { uint8_t req_hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE]; size_t req_hash_len; int req_md_nid; - struct sec_config kcfg; + struct sec_config scfg; struct oap_hdr local_hdr; void * pkp; /* Ephemeral keypair */ uint8_t * key; /* For client-encap KEM */ @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ struct oap_cli_ctx { extern int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info, void ** pkp, void ** crt); -extern int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info, +extern int load_cli_sec_config(const struct name_info * info, struct sec_config * cfg); extern int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name, struct sec_config * cfg, @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info, return load_credentials(info->name, &info->c, pkp, crt); } -int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info, +int load_cli_sec_config(const struct name_info * info, struct sec_config * cfg) { assert(info != NULL); @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info, /* A client authenticates the server by default, like an https client */ cfg->a.req = OAP_CLIENT_AUTH_DEFAULT; - return load_kex_config(info->name, info->c.sec, cfg); + return load_sec_config(info->name, info->c.sec, cfg); } int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name, @@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name, static int do_client_kex_prepare_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s) { - struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg; + struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg; buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex; uint8_t * id = s->id.data; ssize_t len; /* Generate ephemeral keypair, send PK */ - len = kex_pkp_create(kcfg, &s->pkp, kex->data); + len = kex_pkp_create(scfg, &s->pkp, kex->data); if (len < 0) { log_err_id(id, "Failed to generate DHE keypair."); return -ECRYPT; @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int do_client_kex_prepare_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s) kex->len = (size_t) len; log_dbg_id(id, "Generated ephemeral %s keys (%zd bytes).", - kcfg->x.str, len); + scfg->x.str, len); return 0; } @@ -160,24 +160,24 @@ static int do_client_kex_prepare_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s) static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_encap(const char * server_name, struct oap_cli_ctx * s) { - struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg; + struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg; buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex; uint8_t * id = s->id.data; buffer_t server_pk = BUF_INIT; uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ]; ssize_t len; - if (load_server_kem_pk(server_name, kcfg, &server_pk) < 0) { + if (load_server_kem_pk(server_name, scfg, &server_pk) < 0) { log_err_id(id, "Failed to load server KEM pk."); return -ECRYPT; } - if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(kcfg->x.str)) + if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(scfg->x.str)) len = kex_kem_encap_raw(server_pk, kex->data, - kcfg->k.nid, key_buf); + scfg->k.nid, key_buf); else len = kex_kem_encap(server_pk, kex->data, - kcfg->k.nid, key_buf); + scfg->k.nid, key_buf); freebuf(server_pk); @@ -203,13 +203,13 @@ static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_encap(const char * server_name, static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_decap(struct oap_cli_ctx * s) { - struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg; + struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg; buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex; uint8_t * id = s->id.data; ssize_t len; /* Server encaps: generate keypair, send PK */ - len = kex_pkp_create(kcfg, &s->pkp, kex->data); + len = kex_pkp_create(scfg, &s->pkp, kex->data); if (len < 0) { log_err_id(id, "Failed to generate KEM keypair."); return -ECRYPT; @@ -224,13 +224,13 @@ static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_decap(struct oap_cli_ctx * s) static int do_client_kex_prepare(const char * server_name, struct oap_cli_ctx * s) { - struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg; + struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg; - if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(kcfg)) + if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(scfg)) return 0; - if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(kcfg->x.str)) { - if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) + if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(scfg->x.str)) { + if (scfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) return do_client_kex_prepare_kem_encap(server_name, s); else return do_client_kex_prepare_kem_decap(s); @@ -283,16 +283,16 @@ int oap_cli_prepare(void ** ctx, goto fail_id; } - /* Load KEX config */ - if (load_cli_kex_config(info, &s->kcfg) < 0) { - log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to load KEX config for %s.", + /* Load security config */ + if (load_cli_sec_config(info, &s->scfg) < 0) { + log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to load security config for %s.", info->name); goto fail_kex; } /* Re-key forces server-encap: client-encap forfeits FS/PCS. */ - if (rekey && s->kcfg.x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) { - s->kcfg.x.mode = KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP; + if (rekey && s->scfg.x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) { + s->scfg.x.mode = KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP; log_dbg_id(s->id.data, "Re-key forcing ephemeral server KEX."); } @@ -302,14 +302,14 @@ int oap_cli_prepare(void ** ctx, crt = NULL; } - oap_hdr_init(&s->local_hdr, s->id, s->kex_buf, data, s->kcfg.c.nid); + oap_hdr_init(&s->local_hdr, s->id, s->kex_buf, data, s->scfg.c.nid); if (do_client_kex_prepare(info->name, s) < 0) { log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to prepare client KEX."); goto fail_kex; } - if (oap_hdr_encode(&s->local_hdr, pkp, crt, &s->kcfg, + if (oap_hdr_encode(&s->local_hdr, pkp, crt, &s->scfg, no_tag, NID_undef, NULL)) { log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to create OAP request header."); goto fail_hdr; @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ int oap_cli_prepare(void ** ctx, debug_oap_hdr_snd(&s->local_hdr); /* Compute and store hash of request for verification in complete */ - s->req_md_nid = s->kcfg.d.nid != NID_undef ? s->kcfg.d.nid : NID_sha384; + s->req_md_nid = s->scfg.d.nid != NID_undef ? s->scfg.d.nid : NID_sha384; ret = md_digest(s->req_md_nid, s->local_hdr.hdr, s->req_hash); if (ret < 0) { log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to hash request."); @@ -378,11 +378,11 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_kem(struct oap_cli_ctx * s, const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr, struct crypt_sk * sk) { - struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg; + struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg; uint8_t * id = s->id.data; uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ]; - if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP) { + if (scfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP) { buffer_t ct; if (peer_hdr->kex.len == 0) { @@ -393,27 +393,27 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_kem(struct oap_cli_ctx * s, ct.data = peer_hdr->kex.data; ct.len = peer_hdr->kex.len; - if (kex_kem_decap(s->pkp, ct, kcfg->k.nid, key_buf) < 0) { + if (kex_kem_decap(s->pkp, ct, scfg->k.nid, key_buf) < 0) { log_err_id(id, "Failed to decapsulate KEM."); return -ECRYPT; } log_dbg_id(id, "Client decapsulated server CT."); - } else if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) { + } else if (scfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) { /* Key already derived during prepare */ memcpy(sk->key, s->key, SYMMKEYSZ); - sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid; - log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str, - kcfg->c.str); + sk->nid = scfg->c.nid; + log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", scfg->x.str, + scfg->c.str); return 0; } memcpy(sk->key, key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ); - sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid; + sk->nid = scfg->c.nid; crypt_secure_clear(key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ); - log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str, kcfg->c.str); + log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", scfg->x.str, scfg->c.str); return 0; } @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s, const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr, struct crypt_sk * sk) { - struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg; + struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg; uint8_t * id = s->id.data; uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ]; @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s, return -ECRYPT; } - if (kex_dhe_derive(kcfg, s->pkp, peer_hdr->kex, key_buf) < 0) { + if (kex_dhe_derive(scfg, s->pkp, peer_hdr->kex, key_buf) < 0) { log_err_id(id, "Failed to derive DHE secret."); return -ECRYPT; } @@ -440,10 +440,10 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s, log_dbg_id(id, "DHE: derived shared secret."); memcpy(sk->key, key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ); - sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid; + sk->nid = scfg->c.nid; crypt_secure_clear(key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ); - log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str, kcfg->c.str); + log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", scfg->x.str, scfg->c.str); return 0; } @@ -453,17 +453,17 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete(struct oap_cli_ctx * s, const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr, struct crypt_sk * sk) { - struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg; + struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg; uint8_t * id = s->id.data; int cipher_nid; int kdf_nid; - if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(kcfg)) + if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(scfg)) return 0; /* Save client's configured minimums */ - cipher_nid = kcfg->c.nid; - kdf_nid = kcfg->k.nid; + cipher_nid = scfg->c.nid; + kdf_nid = scfg->k.nid; /* Accept server's cipher choice */ if (peer_hdr->cipher_str == NULL) { @@ -471,15 +471,15 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete(struct oap_cli_ctx * s, return -ECRYPT; } - SET_KEX_CIPHER(kcfg, peer_hdr->cipher_str); - if (crypt_validate_nid(kcfg->c.nid) < 0) { + SET_KEX_CIPHER(scfg, peer_hdr->cipher_str); + if (crypt_validate_nid(scfg->c.nid) < 0) { log_err_id(id, "Server cipher '%s' not supported.", peer_hdr->cipher_str); return -ENOTSUP; } /* Verify server cipher >= client's minimum */ - if (crypt_cipher_rank(kcfg->c.nid) < crypt_cipher_rank(cipher_nid)) { + if (crypt_cipher_rank(scfg->c.nid) < crypt_cipher_rank(cipher_nid)) { log_err_id(id, "Server cipher %s too weak.", peer_hdr->cipher_str); return -ECRYPT; @@ -489,20 +489,20 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete(struct oap_cli_ctx * s, peer_hdr->cipher_str); /* Accept server's KDF for non-client-encap modes */ - if (kcfg->x.mode != KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP + if (scfg->x.mode != KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP && peer_hdr->kdf_nid != NID_undef) { if (crypt_kdf_rank(peer_hdr->kdf_nid) < crypt_kdf_rank(kdf_nid)) { log_err_id(id, "Server KDF too weak."); return -ECRYPT; } - SET_KEX_KDF_NID(kcfg, peer_hdr->kdf_nid); + SET_KEX_KDF_NID(scfg, peer_hdr->kdf_nid); log_dbg_id(id, "Accepted server KDF %s.", - md_nid_to_str(kcfg->k.nid)); + md_nid_to_str(scfg->k.nid)); } /* Derive shared secret */ - if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(kcfg->x.str)) + if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(scfg->x.str)) return do_client_kex_complete_kem(s, peer_hdr, sk); return do_client_kex_complete_dhe(s, peer_hdr, sk); @@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ int oap_cli_complete(void * ctx, } /* Authenticate server (cert + signature now in cleartext) */ - if (oap_auth_peer(peer, &s->kcfg, &s->local_hdr, &peer_hdr, + if (oap_auth_peer(peer, &s->scfg, &s->local_hdr, &peer_hdr, cached_crt) < 0) { log_err_id(id, "Failed to authenticate server."); goto fail_oap; @@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ int oap_cli_complete(void * ctx, } if (oap_bind_session_key(sk, req_hash, resp_hash, - s->kcfg.k.nid) < 0) { + s->scfg.k.nid) < 0) { log_err_id(id, "Failed to bind session key."); goto fail_oap; } @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ int oap_cli_complete(void * ctx, } } else { /* Cleartext path is config-driven, never a wire downgrade */ - assert(!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(&s->kcfg)); + assert(!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(&s->scfg)); /* Unencrypted: verify request-echo integrity */ if (crypt_ct_cmp(peer_hdr.rsp_tag.data, s->req_hash, s->req_hash_len) != 0) { |
