summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/irmd/oap/cli.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/irmd/oap/cli.c')
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/cli.c106
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/cli.c b/src/irmd/oap/cli.c
index 2db56792..689d67ca 100644
--- a/src/irmd/oap/cli.c
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/cli.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ struct oap_cli_ctx {
uint8_t req_hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
size_t req_hash_len;
int req_md_nid;
- struct sec_config kcfg;
+ struct sec_config scfg;
struct oap_hdr local_hdr;
void * pkp; /* Ephemeral keypair */
uint8_t * key; /* For client-encap KEM */
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ struct oap_cli_ctx {
extern int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
void ** pkp,
void ** crt);
-extern int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+extern int load_cli_sec_config(const struct name_info * info,
struct sec_config * cfg);
extern int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
struct sec_config * cfg,
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
return load_credentials(info->name, &info->c, pkp, crt);
}
-int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+int load_cli_sec_config(const struct name_info * info,
struct sec_config * cfg)
{
assert(info != NULL);
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
/* A client authenticates the server by default, like an https client */
cfg->a.req = OAP_CLIENT_AUTH_DEFAULT;
- return load_kex_config(info->name, info->c.sec, cfg);
+ return load_sec_config(info->name, info->c.sec, cfg);
}
int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
@@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
static int do_client_kex_prepare_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
{
- struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg;
buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex;
uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
ssize_t len;
/* Generate ephemeral keypair, send PK */
- len = kex_pkp_create(kcfg, &s->pkp, kex->data);
+ len = kex_pkp_create(scfg, &s->pkp, kex->data);
if (len < 0) {
log_err_id(id, "Failed to generate DHE keypair.");
return -ECRYPT;
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int do_client_kex_prepare_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
kex->len = (size_t) len;
log_dbg_id(id, "Generated ephemeral %s keys (%zd bytes).",
- kcfg->x.str, len);
+ scfg->x.str, len);
return 0;
}
@@ -160,24 +160,24 @@ static int do_client_kex_prepare_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_encap(const char * server_name,
struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
{
- struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg;
buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex;
uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
buffer_t server_pk = BUF_INIT;
uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ];
ssize_t len;
- if (load_server_kem_pk(server_name, kcfg, &server_pk) < 0) {
+ if (load_server_kem_pk(server_name, scfg, &server_pk) < 0) {
log_err_id(id, "Failed to load server KEM pk.");
return -ECRYPT;
}
- if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(kcfg->x.str))
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(scfg->x.str))
len = kex_kem_encap_raw(server_pk, kex->data,
- kcfg->k.nid, key_buf);
+ scfg->k.nid, key_buf);
else
len = kex_kem_encap(server_pk, kex->data,
- kcfg->k.nid, key_buf);
+ scfg->k.nid, key_buf);
freebuf(server_pk);
@@ -203,13 +203,13 @@ static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_encap(const char * server_name,
static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_decap(struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
{
- struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg;
buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex;
uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
ssize_t len;
/* Server encaps: generate keypair, send PK */
- len = kex_pkp_create(kcfg, &s->pkp, kex->data);
+ len = kex_pkp_create(scfg, &s->pkp, kex->data);
if (len < 0) {
log_err_id(id, "Failed to generate KEM keypair.");
return -ECRYPT;
@@ -224,13 +224,13 @@ static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_decap(struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
static int do_client_kex_prepare(const char * server_name,
struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
{
- struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg;
- if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(kcfg))
+ if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(scfg))
return 0;
- if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(kcfg->x.str)) {
- if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP)
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(scfg->x.str)) {
+ if (scfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP)
return do_client_kex_prepare_kem_encap(server_name, s);
else
return do_client_kex_prepare_kem_decap(s);
@@ -283,16 +283,16 @@ int oap_cli_prepare(void ** ctx,
goto fail_id;
}
- /* Load KEX config */
- if (load_cli_kex_config(info, &s->kcfg) < 0) {
- log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to load KEX config for %s.",
+ /* Load security config */
+ if (load_cli_sec_config(info, &s->scfg) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to load security config for %s.",
info->name);
goto fail_kex;
}
/* Re-key forces server-encap: client-encap forfeits FS/PCS. */
- if (rekey && s->kcfg.x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) {
- s->kcfg.x.mode = KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP;
+ if (rekey && s->scfg.x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) {
+ s->scfg.x.mode = KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP;
log_dbg_id(s->id.data, "Re-key forcing ephemeral server KEX.");
}
@@ -302,14 +302,14 @@ int oap_cli_prepare(void ** ctx,
crt = NULL;
}
- oap_hdr_init(&s->local_hdr, s->id, s->kex_buf, data, s->kcfg.c.nid);
+ oap_hdr_init(&s->local_hdr, s->id, s->kex_buf, data, s->scfg.c.nid);
if (do_client_kex_prepare(info->name, s) < 0) {
log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to prepare client KEX.");
goto fail_kex;
}
- if (oap_hdr_encode(&s->local_hdr, pkp, crt, &s->kcfg,
+ if (oap_hdr_encode(&s->local_hdr, pkp, crt, &s->scfg,
no_tag, NID_undef, NULL)) {
log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to create OAP request header.");
goto fail_hdr;
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ int oap_cli_prepare(void ** ctx,
debug_oap_hdr_snd(&s->local_hdr);
/* Compute and store hash of request for verification in complete */
- s->req_md_nid = s->kcfg.d.nid != NID_undef ? s->kcfg.d.nid : NID_sha384;
+ s->req_md_nid = s->scfg.d.nid != NID_undef ? s->scfg.d.nid : NID_sha384;
ret = md_digest(s->req_md_nid, s->local_hdr.hdr, s->req_hash);
if (ret < 0) {
log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to hash request.");
@@ -378,11 +378,11 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_kem(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
- struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg;
uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ];
- if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP) {
+ if (scfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP) {
buffer_t ct;
if (peer_hdr->kex.len == 0) {
@@ -393,27 +393,27 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_kem(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
ct.data = peer_hdr->kex.data;
ct.len = peer_hdr->kex.len;
- if (kex_kem_decap(s->pkp, ct, kcfg->k.nid, key_buf) < 0) {
+ if (kex_kem_decap(s->pkp, ct, scfg->k.nid, key_buf) < 0) {
log_err_id(id, "Failed to decapsulate KEM.");
return -ECRYPT;
}
log_dbg_id(id, "Client decapsulated server CT.");
- } else if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) {
+ } else if (scfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) {
/* Key already derived during prepare */
memcpy(sk->key, s->key, SYMMKEYSZ);
- sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid;
- log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str,
- kcfg->c.str);
+ sk->nid = scfg->c.nid;
+ log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", scfg->x.str,
+ scfg->c.str);
return 0;
}
memcpy(sk->key, key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
- sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid;
+ sk->nid = scfg->c.nid;
crypt_secure_clear(key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
- log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str, kcfg->c.str);
+ log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", scfg->x.str, scfg->c.str);
return 0;
}
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
- struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg;
uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ];
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
return -ECRYPT;
}
- if (kex_dhe_derive(kcfg, s->pkp, peer_hdr->kex, key_buf) < 0) {
+ if (kex_dhe_derive(scfg, s->pkp, peer_hdr->kex, key_buf) < 0) {
log_err_id(id, "Failed to derive DHE secret.");
return -ECRYPT;
}
@@ -440,10 +440,10 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
log_dbg_id(id, "DHE: derived shared secret.");
memcpy(sk->key, key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
- sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid;
+ sk->nid = scfg->c.nid;
crypt_secure_clear(key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
- log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str, kcfg->c.str);
+ log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", scfg->x.str, scfg->c.str);
return 0;
}
@@ -453,17 +453,17 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
- struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ struct sec_config * scfg = &s->scfg;
uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
int cipher_nid;
int kdf_nid;
- if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(kcfg))
+ if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(scfg))
return 0;
/* Save client's configured minimums */
- cipher_nid = kcfg->c.nid;
- kdf_nid = kcfg->k.nid;
+ cipher_nid = scfg->c.nid;
+ kdf_nid = scfg->k.nid;
/* Accept server's cipher choice */
if (peer_hdr->cipher_str == NULL) {
@@ -471,15 +471,15 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
return -ECRYPT;
}
- SET_KEX_CIPHER(kcfg, peer_hdr->cipher_str);
- if (crypt_validate_nid(kcfg->c.nid) < 0) {
+ SET_KEX_CIPHER(scfg, peer_hdr->cipher_str);
+ if (crypt_validate_nid(scfg->c.nid) < 0) {
log_err_id(id, "Server cipher '%s' not supported.",
peer_hdr->cipher_str);
return -ENOTSUP;
}
/* Verify server cipher >= client's minimum */
- if (crypt_cipher_rank(kcfg->c.nid) < crypt_cipher_rank(cipher_nid)) {
+ if (crypt_cipher_rank(scfg->c.nid) < crypt_cipher_rank(cipher_nid)) {
log_err_id(id, "Server cipher %s too weak.",
peer_hdr->cipher_str);
return -ECRYPT;
@@ -489,20 +489,20 @@ static int do_client_kex_complete(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
peer_hdr->cipher_str);
/* Accept server's KDF for non-client-encap modes */
- if (kcfg->x.mode != KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP
+ if (scfg->x.mode != KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP
&& peer_hdr->kdf_nid != NID_undef) {
if (crypt_kdf_rank(peer_hdr->kdf_nid)
< crypt_kdf_rank(kdf_nid)) {
log_err_id(id, "Server KDF too weak.");
return -ECRYPT;
}
- SET_KEX_KDF_NID(kcfg, peer_hdr->kdf_nid);
+ SET_KEX_KDF_NID(scfg, peer_hdr->kdf_nid);
log_dbg_id(id, "Accepted server KDF %s.",
- md_nid_to_str(kcfg->k.nid));
+ md_nid_to_str(scfg->k.nid));
}
/* Derive shared secret */
- if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(kcfg->x.str))
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(scfg->x.str))
return do_client_kex_complete_kem(s, peer_hdr, sk);
return do_client_kex_complete_dhe(s, peer_hdr, sk);
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ int oap_cli_complete(void * ctx,
}
/* Authenticate server (cert + signature now in cleartext) */
- if (oap_auth_peer(peer, &s->kcfg, &s->local_hdr, &peer_hdr,
+ if (oap_auth_peer(peer, &s->scfg, &s->local_hdr, &peer_hdr,
cached_crt) < 0) {
log_err_id(id, "Failed to authenticate server.");
goto fail_oap;
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ int oap_cli_complete(void * ctx,
}
if (oap_bind_session_key(sk, req_hash, resp_hash,
- s->kcfg.k.nid) < 0) {
+ s->scfg.k.nid) < 0) {
log_err_id(id, "Failed to bind session key.");
goto fail_oap;
}
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ int oap_cli_complete(void * ctx,
}
} else {
/* Cleartext path is config-driven, never a wire downgrade */
- assert(!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(&s->kcfg));
+ assert(!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(&s->scfg));
/* Unencrypted: verify request-echo integrity */
if (crypt_ct_cmp(peer_hdr.rsp_tag.data, s->req_hash,
s->req_hash_len) != 0) {
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2026-07-01 21:14:56 +0000