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Diffstat (limited to 'src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c')
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c1168
1 files changed, 1048 insertions, 120 deletions
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c b/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c
index 2f0f0b4d..b24bb786 100644
--- a/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
#include <ouroboros/endian.h>
+#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
#include <ouroboros/flow.h>
#include <ouroboros/name.h>
#include <ouroboros/random.h>
@@ -41,18 +42,18 @@
#include <test/certs/ecdsa.h>
#include "oap.h"
+#include "oap/auth.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
-#define AUTH true
-#define NO_AUTH false
-
extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[];
extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[];
@@ -113,6 +114,13 @@ static void test_default_cfg(void)
test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
}
+/* Encrypted, unauthenticated on both sides. */
+static void test_enc_noauth_cfg(void)
+{
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+}
+
static int test_oap_auth_init_fini(void)
{
TEST_START();
@@ -174,6 +182,7 @@ static int test_oap_roundtrip(int kex)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", kex_str);
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -198,23 +207,141 @@ static int test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only(void)
return roundtrip_auth_only(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
}
-static int test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only(void)
+static int test_oap_rekey(bool srv_auth,
+ bool cli_auth)
{
- memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = srv_auth;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = cli_auth;
- /* Server: KEX only, no auth */
- test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
- test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
- test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ return roundtrip_rekey(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec,
+ srv_auth, cli_auth);
+}
- /* Client: KEX only, no auth */
- test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
- test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
- test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+static int test_oap_rekey_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey(AUTH, NO_AUTH);
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey(AUTH, AUTH);
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey(NO_AUTH, AUTH);
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey(NO_AUTH, NO_AUTH);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_rekey_srv_badcache(bool srv_auth)
+{
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = srv_auth;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = AUTH;
+
+ return roundtrip_rekey_srv_badcache(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec,
+ srv_auth);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_rekey_srv_badcache_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey_srv_badcache(AUTH);
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey_srv_badcache(NO_AUTH);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_rekey_badcache(bool cli_auth)
+{
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = cli_auth;
+
+ return roundtrip_rekey_badcache(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec,
+ cli_auth);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_rekey_badcache_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey_badcache(NO_AUTH);
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey_badcache(AUTH);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Absent sec config (ENOENT) clears the KEX; a re-key must fail closed. */
+static int test_oap_cli_rejects_rekey_no_kex(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ test_enc_noauth_cfg();
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_undef;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ ctx.rekey = true;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client prepared a re-key without KEX.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_srv_rejects_rekey_no_kex(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ test_enc_noauth_cfg();
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_undef;
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_undef;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* First-contact plaintext request, replayed as a re-key. */
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ctx.rekey = true;
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server accepted a re-key without KEX.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only(void)
+{
+ test_enc_noauth_cfg();
return roundtrip_kex_only();
}
@@ -238,6 +365,7 @@ static int test_oap_piggyback_data(void)
ctx.data.data = malloc(ctx.data.len);
if (ctx.data.data == NULL)
goto fail_cleanup;
+
memcpy(ctx.data.data, cli_data_str, ctx.data.len);
if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0)
@@ -288,6 +416,7 @@ static int test_oap_piggyback_data(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -356,6 +485,7 @@ static int test_oap_inflated_length_field(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -400,6 +530,7 @@ static int test_oap_deflated_length_field(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -411,8 +542,13 @@ static int test_oap_deflated_length_field(void)
/* Header field offsets for byte manipulation */
#define OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET 24
+#define OAP_KDF_NID_OFFSET 26
+#define OAP_MD_NID_OFFSET 28
#define OAP_KEX_LEN_OFFSET 32
+/* A NID the crypto backend does not recognise; guarded by a test below. */
+#define UNSUPPORTED_NID 9999
+
/* Server rejects request when cipher NID set but no KEX data provided */
static int test_oap_nid_without_kex(void)
{
@@ -420,20 +556,9 @@ static int test_oap_nid_without_kex(void)
uint16_t cipher_nid;
uint16_t zero = 0;
- TEST_START();
+ test_enc_noauth_cfg();
- /* Configure unsigned KEX-only mode */
- memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
- test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
- test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
- test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
- test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
- test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
- test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ TEST_START();
if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
goto fail;
@@ -458,6 +583,7 @@ static int test_oap_nid_without_kex(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -467,26 +593,44 @@ static int test_oap_nid_without_kex(void)
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
-/* Server rejects OAP request with unsupported cipher NID */
-static int test_oap_unsupported_nid(void)
+/* Guard: the tamper tests below rely on UNSUPPORTED_NID being invalid. */
+static int test_oap_unsupported_nid_undefined(void)
+{
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (crypt_cipher_rank(UNSUPPORTED_NID) >= 0) {
+ printf("UNSUPPORTED_NID is a valid cipher NID.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_kdf_rank(UNSUPPORTED_NID) >= 0) {
+ printf("UNSUPPORTED_NID is a valid KDF NID.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (md_validate_nid(UNSUPPORTED_NID) >= 0) {
+ printf("UNSUPPORTED_NID is a valid digest NID.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Server rejects a request whose cipher/kdf/digest NID is unsupported */
+static int test_oap_unsupported_nid(size_t offset,
+ const char * label)
{
struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
uint16_t bad_nid;
- TEST_START();
+ test_enc_noauth_cfg();
- /* Configure unsigned KEX-only mode */
- memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
- test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
- test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
- test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
- test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
- test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
- test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ TEST_START("(%s)", label);
if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
goto fail;
@@ -496,19 +640,73 @@ static int test_oap_unsupported_nid(void)
goto fail_cleanup;
}
- /* Tamper: set cipher_nid to unsupported value */
- bad_nid = hton16(9999);
- memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET, &bad_nid,
- sizeof(bad_nid));
+ bad_nid = hton16(UNSUPPORTED_NID);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + offset, &bad_nid, sizeof(bad_nid));
if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
- printf("Server should reject unsupported cipher NID.\n");
+ printf("Server should reject unsupported %s NID.\n", label);
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", label);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", label);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_unsupported_nid_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_unsupported_nid(OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET, "cipher");
+ ret |= test_oap_unsupported_nid(OAP_KDF_NID_OFFSET, "kdf");
+ ret |= test_oap_unsupported_nid(OAP_MD_NID_OFFSET, "digest");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Client rejects a response whose key-confirmation tag is tampered */
+static int test_oap_key_confirm_mismatch(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ /* Unauthenticated + encrypted: response unsigned, KC is the gate */
+ test_enc_noauth_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* The key-confirm tag is the last field of an unsigned response */
+ ctx.resp_hdr.data[ctx.resp_hdr.len - 1] ^= 0xFF;
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client accepted a bad key-confirmation tag.\n");
goto fail_cleanup;
}
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -609,6 +807,7 @@ static int test_oap_cipher_mismatch(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -655,6 +854,7 @@ static int test_oap_srv_enc_cli_none(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -724,6 +924,7 @@ static int test_oap_cli_enc_srv_none(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -733,27 +934,15 @@ static int test_oap_cli_enc_srv_none(void)
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
-/* Client rejects server response with downgraded cipher */
+/* Unauthenticated server: client floor-rejects a downgraded cipher */
static int test_oap_cli_rejects_downgrade(void)
{
struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
uint16_t weak;
- TEST_START();
-
- memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
-
- test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
- test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
- test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+ test_enc_noauth_cfg();
- test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
- test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
- test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
- test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ TEST_START();
if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
goto fail;
@@ -769,7 +958,7 @@ static int test_oap_cli_rejects_downgrade(void)
}
/* Tamper: replace cipher NID with weaker one */
- weak = hton16(NID_aes_128_ctr);
+ weak = hton16(NID_aes_128_gcm);
memcpy(ctx.resp_hdr.data + OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET,
&weak, sizeof(weak));
@@ -782,6 +971,60 @@ static int test_oap_cli_rejects_downgrade(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Suite binding: a cipher swapped to a higher rank clears the client floor
+ * check, but the bound key commits to the negotiated suite, so the swap must
+ * still fail key confirmation.
+ */
+static int test_oap_cli_rejects_suite_swap(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t swap;
+
+ /* Both AES-128-GCM: a swap to AES-256 outranks the client floor */
+ test_enc_noauth_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_128_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_128_gcm;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Swap the response cipher to a higher-ranked one */
+ swap = hton16(NID_aes_256_gcm);
+ memcpy(ctx.resp_hdr.data + OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET,
+ &swap, sizeof(swap));
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client accepted a swapped cipher suite.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -831,6 +1074,7 @@ static int test_oap_srv_rejects_weak_kex(void)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -890,6 +1134,7 @@ static int test_oap_roundtrip_md(int md)
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", md_str ? md_str : "default");
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -917,15 +1162,17 @@ static int test_oap_roundtrip_md_all(void)
/* Timestamp is at offset 16 (after the 16-byte ID) */
#define OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET 16
/* Test that packets with outdated timestamps are rejected */
-static int test_oap_outdated_packet(void)
+/* Server rejects a request whose timestamp is outside the replay window */
+static int test_oap_ts_reject(int delta_sec,
+ const char * label)
{
struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
- struct timespec old_ts;
- uint64_t old_stamp;
+ struct timespec ts;
+ uint64_t stamp;
test_default_cfg();
- TEST_START();
+ TEST_START("(%s)", label);
if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
goto fail;
@@ -940,21 +1187,363 @@ static int test_oap_outdated_packet(void)
goto fail_cleanup;
}
- /* Set timestamp to 30 seconds in the past (> 20s replay timer) */
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &old_ts);
- old_ts.tv_sec -= OAP_REPLAY_TIMER + 10;
- old_stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(old_ts));
- memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET, &old_stamp,
- sizeof(old_stamp));
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+ ts.tv_sec += delta_sec;
+ stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(ts));
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET, &stamp,
+ sizeof(stamp));
if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
- printf("Server should reject outdated packet.\n");
+ printf("Server should reject %s packet.\n", label);
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", label);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", label);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_ts_reject_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Past the 20s replay window, and past the 100ms future slack. */
+ ret |= test_oap_ts_reject(-(OAP_REPLAY_TIMER + 10), "outdated");
+ ret |= test_oap_ts_reject(1, "future");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Test that replayed packets (same ID + timestamp) are rejected */
+static int test_oap_replay_packet(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ buffer_t saved_req;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the request for replay */
+ saved_req.len = ctx.req_hdr.len;
+ saved_req.data = malloc(saved_req.len);
+ if (saved_req.data == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to allocate saved request.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+ memcpy(saved_req.data, ctx.req_hdr.data, saved_req.len);
+
+ /* First request should succeed */
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("First request should succeed.\n");
+ free(saved_req.data);
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Free response from first request before replay */
+ freebuf(ctx.resp_hdr);
+
+ /* Restore the saved request for replay */
+ freebuf(ctx.req_hdr);
+ ctx.req_hdr = saved_req;
+
+ /* Replay must return -EREPLAY so callers can drop silently. */
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) != -EREPLAY) {
+ printf("Replayed packet rejection != -EREPLAY.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Encode a distinct OAP session ID from an index */
+static void make_id(uint8_t * id,
+ size_t idx)
+{
+ memset(id, 0, OAP_ID_SIZE);
+ memcpy(id, &idx, sizeof(idx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Replay cache fails closed at capacity: a flood is rejected and no genuine
+ * entry is evicted (so it cannot be replayed).
+ */
+static int test_oap_replay_cap(void)
+{
+ struct oap_hdr h;
+ struct timespec now;
+ uint8_t id[OAP_ID_SIZE];
+ uint64_t stamp;
+ size_t i;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_auth_init() < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to init OAP.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
+ stamp = TS_TO_UINT64(now);
+
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+ h.id.data = id;
+ h.id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+ h.timestamp = stamp;
+
+ /* Fill one generation bucket to capacity with distinct IDs */
+ for (i = 0; i < OAP_REPLAY_MAX; i++) {
+ make_id(id, i);
+ if (oap_check_hdr(&h) != 0) {
+ printf("Distinct header %zu rejected.\n", i);
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* One past capacity fails closed (rejected, not evict-oldest) */
+ make_id(id, OAP_REPLAY_MAX);
+ if (oap_check_hdr(&h) != -EAUTH) {
+ printf("Header past capacity not fail-closed.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ /* No genuine entry was evicted: the oldest still reads as a replay */
+ make_id(id, 0);
+ if (oap_check_hdr(&h) != -EREPLAY) {
+ printf("Genuine entry evicted under flood.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ oap_auth_fini();
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_fini:
+ oap_auth_fini();
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Distinct timestamp generations use separate buckets and are detected
+ * independently (covers the multi-generation / rotation path).
+ */
+static int test_oap_replay_generations(void)
+{
+ struct oap_hdr h;
+ struct timespec now;
+ struct timespec wait;
+ uint8_t id[OAP_ID_SIZE];
+ uint64_t cur;
+ uint64_t gen_ns;
+ uint64_t off;
+ uint64_t wait_ns;
+ uint64_t stamp_a;
+ uint64_t stamp_b;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_auth_init() < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to init OAP.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ gen_ns = (uint64_t) OAP_REPLAY_TIMER * BILLION;
+
+ /* Prev-gen stamp flakes on staleness near a generation top. */
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
+ cur = TS_TO_UINT64(now);
+ off = cur % gen_ns;
+ if (gen_ns - off < BILLION) {
+ wait_ns = gen_ns - off + MILLION;
+ wait.tv_sec = (time_t) (wait_ns / BILLION);
+ wait.tv_nsec = (long) (wait_ns % BILLION);
+ nanosleep(&wait, NULL);
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
+ cur = TS_TO_UINT64(now);
+ }
+
+ /* stamp_a in the current generation, stamp_b one generation older */
+ stamp_a = cur;
+ stamp_b = (cur / gen_ns) * gen_ns - 1;
+
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+ h.id.data = id;
+ h.id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+ make_id(id, 1);
+
+ /* First sighting in each generation is accepted */
+ h.timestamp = stamp_a;
+ if (oap_check_hdr(&h) != 0) {
+ printf("Gen-A header rejected.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ h.timestamp = stamp_b;
+ if (oap_check_hdr(&h) != 0) {
+ printf("Gen-B header rejected.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ /* Each generation independently detects its own replay */
+ h.timestamp = stamp_a;
+ if (oap_check_hdr(&h) != -EREPLAY) {
+ printf("Gen-A replay not detected.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ h.timestamp = stamp_b;
+ if (oap_check_hdr(&h) != -EREPLAY) {
+ printf("Gen-B replay not detected.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ oap_auth_fini();
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_fini:
+ oap_auth_fini();
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Server rejects client certificate when root CA is missing from store */
+static int test_oap_missing_root_ca(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ void * im_ca = NULL;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+ strcpy(ctx.srv.info.name, "test-1.unittest.o7s");
+ strcpy(ctx.cli.info.name, "test-1.unittest.o7s");
+
+ if (oap_auth_init() < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to init OAP.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Load intermediate CA but intentionally omit the root CA */
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(im_ca_crt_ec, &im_ca) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load intermediate CA cert.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ ctx.im_ca = im_ca;
+
+ if (oap_auth_add_ca_crt(im_ca) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to add intermediate CA cert to store.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_fini;
+ }
+
+ /* Server processes and signs response - succeeds without root CA */
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_teardown;
+ }
+
+ /* Client verifies server certificate against trust store:
+ * should reject because root CA is not in the store */
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client should reject without root CA.\n");
+ goto fail_teardown;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_teardown:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+ fail_fini:
+ crypt_free_crt(im_ca);
+ oap_auth_fini();
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Test that client rejects server with wrong certificate name */
+static int test_oap_server_name_mismatch(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* Set client's expected name to something different from cert name */
+ strcpy(ctx.cli.info.name, "wrong.server.name");
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Client should reject due to name mismatch */
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client should reject server with wrong cert name.\n");
goto fail_cleanup;
}
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -964,14 +1553,14 @@ static int test_oap_outdated_packet(void)
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
-/* Test that packets from the future are rejected */
-static int test_oap_future_packet(void)
+/* Client requiring auth rejects a response without certificate */
+static int test_oap_cli_requires_srv_auth(void)
{
struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
- struct timespec future_ts;
- uint64_t future_stamp;
test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.req_auth = true;
TEST_START();
@@ -983,26 +1572,56 @@ static int test_oap_future_packet(void)
goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET + sizeof(uint64_t)) {
- printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client should reject unauthenticated server.\n");
goto fail_cleanup;
}
- /* Set timestamp to 1 second in the future (> 100ms slack) */
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &future_ts);
- future_ts.tv_sec += 1;
- future_stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(future_ts));
- memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET, &future_stamp,
- sizeof(future_stamp));
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Server requiring auth rejects a request without certificate */
+static int test_oap_srv_requires_cli_auth(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.req_auth = true;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
- printf("Server should reject future packet.\n");
+ printf("Server should reject unauthenticated client.\n");
goto fail_cleanup;
}
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -1012,13 +1631,15 @@ static int test_oap_future_packet(void)
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
-/* Test that replayed packets (same ID + timestamp) are rejected */
-static int test_oap_replay_packet(void)
+/* Roundtrip succeeds when both sides require and provide auth */
+static int test_oap_mutual_req_auth(void)
{
struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
- buffer_t saved_req;
test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.req_auth = true;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.req_auth = true;
TEST_START();
@@ -1030,38 +1651,103 @@ static int test_oap_replay_packet(void)
goto fail_cleanup;
}
- /* Save the request for replay */
- saved_req.len = ctx.req_hdr.len;
- saved_req.data = malloc(saved_req.len);
- if (saved_req.data == NULL) {
- printf("Failed to allocate saved request.\n");
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Client rejects a server signature with a different digest */
+static int test_oap_cli_rejects_md_mismatch(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha384;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
goto fail_cleanup;
}
- memcpy(saved_req.data, ctx.req_hdr.data, saved_req.len);
- /* First request should succeed */
if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
- printf("First request should succeed.\n");
- free(saved_req.data);
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
goto fail_cleanup;
}
- /* Free response from first request before replay */
- freebuf(ctx.resp_hdr);
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client should reject digest mismatch.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
- /* Restore the saved request for replay */
- freebuf(ctx.req_hdr);
- ctx.req_hdr = saved_req;
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Server rejects a client signature with a different digest */
+static int test_oap_srv_rejects_md_mismatch(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha384;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
- /* Replayed request should fail */
if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
- printf("Server should reject replayed packet.\n");
+ printf("Server should reject digest mismatch.\n");
goto fail_cleanup;
}
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -1071,10 +1757,31 @@ static int test_oap_replay_packet(void)
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
-/* Test that client rejects server with wrong certificate name */
-static int test_oap_server_name_mismatch(void)
+/* Naive substring search over raw bytes (memmem is not portable here). */
+static bool buf_contains(const uint8_t * hay,
+ size_t hlen,
+ const uint8_t * needle,
+ size_t nlen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (nlen == 0 || nlen > hlen)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i + nlen <= hlen; i++) {
+ if (memcmp(hay + i, needle, nlen) == 0)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* The server certificate must not appear in cleartext on the wire */
+static int test_oap_server_cert_hidden(void)
{
struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ void * crt = NULL;
+ buffer_t der = BUF_INIT;
test_default_cfg();
@@ -1083,8 +1790,79 @@ static int test_oap_server_name_mismatch(void)
if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
goto fail;
- /* Set client's expected name to something different from cert name */
- strcpy(ctx.cli.info.name, "wrong.server.name");
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load server crt.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_crt_der(crt, &der) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to DER-encode server crt.\n");
+ goto fail_crt;
+ }
+
+ if (der.len == 0 || der.len > ctx.resp_hdr.len) {
+ printf("Unexpected cert/response sizes.\n");
+ goto fail_der;
+ }
+
+ if (buf_contains(ctx.resp_hdr.data, ctx.resp_hdr.len,
+ der.data, der.len)) {
+ printf("Server certificate found in cleartext.\n");
+ goto fail_der;
+ }
+
+ /* The handshake must still complete and agree on a key */
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_der;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_der;
+ }
+
+ freebuf(der);
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_der:
+ freebuf(der);
+ fail_crt:
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Tampering the sealed identity block fails the handshake */
+static int test_oap_sealed_tamper(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ size_t pos;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
@@ -1096,15 +1874,119 @@ static int test_oap_server_name_mismatch(void)
goto fail_cleanup;
}
- /* Client should reject due to name mismatch */
+ if (ctx.resp_hdr.len < 64) {
+ printf("Response too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Flip a byte inside the sealed ciphertext, before the AEAD tag */
+ pos = ctx.resp_hdr.len - 32;
+ ctx.resp_hdr.data[pos] ^= 0xFF;
+
if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
- printf("Client should reject server with wrong cert name.\n");
+ printf("Client accepted a tampered identity block.\n");
goto fail_cleanup;
}
oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Cleartext md-only: rsp_tag echoes H(request) and is the sole gate */
+static int test_oap_cleartext_echo_tamper(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* rsp_tag is the trailing field of an unsealed, unsigned response */
+ ctx.resp_hdr.data[ctx.resp_hdr.len - 1] ^= 0xFF;
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client accepted a tampered request echo.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Client rejects a response whose session ID does not match the request */
+static int test_oap_response_id_tamper(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ /* Cleartext md-only: no seal, so the ID check itself must reject. */
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* The session ID is the first field of the fixed header. */
+ ctx.resp_hdr.data[0] ^= 0xFF;
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client accepted a mismatched response ID.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_cleanup:
@@ -1123,59 +2005,105 @@ int oap_test(int argc,
(void) argv;
ret |= test_oap_auth_init_fini();
+ ret |= test_oap_replay_cap();
+ ret |= test_oap_replay_generations();
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only();
ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only();
ret |= test_oap_piggyback_data();
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey_all();
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey_badcache_all();
+ ret |= test_oap_rekey_srv_badcache_all();
+ ret |= test_oap_cli_rejects_rekey_no_kex();
+ ret |= test_oap_srv_rejects_rekey_no_kex();
ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_all();
ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_md_all();
ret |= test_oap_corrupted_request();
ret |= test_oap_corrupted_response();
+ ret |= test_oap_key_confirm_mismatch();
ret |= test_oap_truncated_request();
ret |= test_oap_inflated_length_field();
ret |= test_oap_deflated_length_field();
ret |= test_oap_nid_without_kex();
- ret |= test_oap_unsupported_nid();
+ ret |= test_oap_unsupported_nid_undefined();
+ ret |= test_oap_unsupported_nid_all();
ret |= test_oap_cipher_mismatch();
ret |= test_oap_srv_enc_cli_none();
ret |= test_oap_cli_enc_srv_none();
ret |= test_oap_cli_rejects_downgrade();
+ ret |= test_oap_cli_rejects_suite_swap();
ret |= test_oap_srv_rejects_weak_kex();
- ret |= test_oap_outdated_packet();
- ret |= test_oap_future_packet();
+ ret |= test_oap_ts_reject_all();
ret |= test_oap_replay_packet();
+ ret |= test_oap_missing_root_ca();
ret |= test_oap_server_name_mismatch();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_cli_requires_srv_auth();
+ ret |= test_oap_srv_requires_cli_auth();
+ ret |= test_oap_mutual_req_auth();
+
+
+ ret |= test_oap_cli_rejects_md_mismatch();
+ ret |= test_oap_srv_rejects_md_mismatch();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_server_cert_hidden();
+ ret |= test_oap_sealed_tamper();
+ ret |= test_oap_cleartext_echo_tamper();
+ ret |= test_oap_response_id_tamper();
#else
(void) test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only;
(void) test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only;
(void) test_oap_piggyback_data;
+ (void) test_oap_rekey_all;
+ (void) test_oap_rekey_badcache_all;
+ (void) test_oap_rekey_srv_badcache_all;
+ (void) test_oap_cli_rejects_rekey_no_kex;
+ (void) test_oap_srv_rejects_rekey_no_kex;
(void) test_oap_roundtrip;
(void) test_oap_roundtrip_all;
(void) test_oap_roundtrip_md;
(void) test_oap_roundtrip_md_all;
(void) test_oap_corrupted_request;
(void) test_oap_corrupted_response;
+ (void) test_oap_key_confirm_mismatch;
(void) test_oap_truncated_request;
(void) test_oap_inflated_length_field;
(void) test_oap_deflated_length_field;
(void) test_oap_nid_without_kex;
(void) test_oap_unsupported_nid;
+ (void) test_oap_unsupported_nid_undefined;
+ (void) test_oap_unsupported_nid_all;
(void) test_oap_cipher_mismatch;
(void) test_oap_srv_enc_cli_none;
(void) test_oap_cli_enc_srv_none;
(void) test_oap_cli_rejects_downgrade;
+ (void) test_oap_cli_rejects_suite_swap;
(void) test_oap_srv_rejects_weak_kex;
- (void) test_oap_outdated_packet;
- (void) test_oap_future_packet;
+ (void) test_oap_ts_reject_all;
(void) test_oap_replay_packet;
+ (void) test_oap_replay_generations;
+ (void) test_oap_missing_root_ca;
(void) test_oap_server_name_mismatch;
+ (void) test_oap_cli_requires_srv_auth;
+ (void) test_oap_srv_requires_cli_auth;
+ (void) test_oap_mutual_req_auth;
+ (void) test_oap_cli_rejects_md_mismatch;
+ (void) test_oap_srv_rejects_md_mismatch;
+ (void) test_oap_server_cert_hidden;
+ (void) test_oap_sealed_tamper;
+ (void) test_oap_cleartext_echo_tamper;
+ (void) test_oap_response_id_tamper;
+ (void) test_oap_rekey;
+ (void) test_oap_rekey_badcache;
ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
#endif
+ crypt_cleanup();
+
return ret;
}