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* build: Update copyright to 2026Dimitri Staessens4 days1-1/+1
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
* lib: Fix crypt test and secure memory initializationDimitri Staessens2026-01-301-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | The crypt_test had a HAVE_OPENSSL guard missing and was trying to execute tests that required OpenSSL without it being installed. The SECMEM values need to be set by CMake without OpenSSL installed. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
* lib: Speed up key rotation testsDimitri Staessens2026-01-261-10/+14
| | | | | | | | | | The tests were not correct as the library was compiled with the default 1 << 20 epoch. Added a parametere to the sk configuration that specifies the epoch size. Set to 1 << KEY_ROTATION_BIT in dev.c, but lowered to 7 in unit tests. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
* lib: Add automatic key rotation for encryptionDimitri Staessens2026-01-231-0/+178
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement forward-secret key rotation using HKDF key derivation. The operation is based on QUIC RFC 9001 and wireguard. Keys rotate every 2^KEY_ROTATION_BIT packets, with the current phase (P) signaled via controlling a bit in the IV (bit 7, first bit on the wire). Default 20 (1M packets). The wire format, after the DT header is: [ P | random IV ][ encrypted blob ][ AEAD tag ] Works with and without retransmission, and the FRCT header is fully contained in the encrypted blob if used. The receiver detects phase changes and rotates accordingly, keeping the previous key valid during a grace period. This handles packet reordering in unreliable flows: the 3/4 period protection window prevents premature rotation when late packets arrive, while the 1/2 period grace window ensures the old key remains available for decryption. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
* lib: Add post-quantum cryptography supportDimitri Staessens2026-01-191-124/+138
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication (ML-DSA). Supported key exchange algorithms: ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448 Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024 Supported ciphers: AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305 CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr Supported HKDFs: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512, blake2b512, blake2s256 Supported Digests for DSA: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512, blake2b512, blake2s256 PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when available. KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles: one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles: kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy) kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key) The enc.conf file format supports: kex=<algorithm> # Key exchange algorithm cipher=<algorithm> # Symmetric cipher kdf=<KDF> # Key derivation function digest=<digest> # Digest for DSA kem_mode=<mode> # Server (default) or client none # Disable encryption The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication infrastructure for integrity and replay protection. Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c). Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0 (required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
* lib: Move encryption control from QoS to nameDimitri Staessens2025-09-101-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This removes the flow encryption option (cypher_s) from the qosspec. The configuration file is configured in the security options (default /etc/ouroboros/security/). For this poc, encryption can be disabled client or server side by putting an enc.cfg file. If that file is present in the client folder, the client will require encryption. If that file is present on the server side, the server will require encryption and reject non-encrypted flows. Encryption is now configured outside of any application control. Example: /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/enc.cfg exists: irmd(II): Encryption enabled for oping. irmd(DB): File /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/crt.pem does not exist. irmd(II): No security info for oping. irmd(DB): Generated ephemeral keys for 87474. irmd/oap(PP): OAP_HDR [caf203681d997941 @ 2025-09-02 17:08:05 (UTC) ] --> irmd/oap(PP): Certificate: <none> irmd/oap(PP): Ephemeral Public Key: [91 bytes] irmd/oap(PP): Data: <none> irmd/oap(PP): Signature: <none> Example: /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/enc.cfg does not exist: irmd(II): Allocating flow for 87506 to oping. irmd(DB): File /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/enc.cfg does not exist. irmd(DB): File /etc/ouroboros/security/client/oping/crt.pem does not exist. irmd(II): No security info for oping. irmd/oap(PP): OAP_HDR [e84bb9d7c3d9c002 @ 2025-09-02 17:08:30 (UTC) ] --> irmd/oap(PP): Certificate: <none> irmd/oap(PP): Ephemeral Public Key: <none> irmd/oap(PP): Data: <none> irmd/oap(PP): Signature: <none> Example: /etc/ouroboros/security/server/oping/enc.cfg exists: irmd(II): Flow request arrived for oping. irmd(DB): IPCP 88112 accepting flow 7 for oping. irmd(II): Encryption enabled for oping. irmd(DB): File /etc/ouroboros/security/server/oping/crt.pem does not exist. irmd(II): No security info for oping. irmd/oap(PP): OAP_HDR [3c717b3f31dff8df @ 2025-09-02 17:13:06 (UTC) ] <-- irmd/oap(PP): Certificate: <none> irmd/oap(PP): Ephemeral Public Key: <none> irmd/oap(PP): Data: <none> irmd/oap(PP): Signature: <none> irmd(WW): Encryption required but no key provided. The server side will pass the ECRYPT to the client: $ oping -l Ouroboros ping server started. Failed to accept flow: -1008 $ oping -n oping -c 1 Failed to allocate flow: -1008. Encryption on flows can now be changed at runtime without needing to touch/reconfigure/restart the process. Note: The ECRYPT result is passed on via the flow allocator responses through the IPCP (discovered/fixed some endianness issues), but the reason for rejecting the flow can be considered N+1 information... We may move that information up into the OAP header at some point. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
* lib: Fix memory leaks in testsDimitri Staessens2025-08-151-0/+2
| | | | | | Fixes memory leaks in the tests that had escaped detection. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
* lib: Add authentication functionsDimitri Staessens2025-07-041-0/+256
Adds functions needed for authentication using X509 certificates, implemented using OpenSSL. Refactors some library internals, and adds some unit tests for them. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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